The National Committee on United States-China Relations observed its 35th anniversary with a celebratory dinner in New York City on October 2, that brought together founding members, American and Chinese government officials, business leaders and hundreds of other supporters. Four American companies – American International Group, Inc., AOL Time Warner Inc., The Coca-Cola Company and J.P. Morgan Chase & Co. – were recognized during the evening’s program for their contributions to U.S.-China relations and their long-term support of the National Committee.

National Committee Chair Carla A. Hills and Dinner Chairman Maurice R. Greenberg opened the program by reflecting on the tragic events of September 11, which had directly affected many of those in the room. Ambassador Hills said that “…a concentrated effort to combat terrorism will require collaboration with countries throughout the world – including the world’s largest country,” underscoring the continuing significance of the National Committee’s work in building productive relations between the United States and China. Journalist and former presidential advisor David R. Gergen, who served as master of ceremonies for the evening, added that “…not all of us can be on the front lines against terrorism, but all of us can be on the front lines of building a better world, and this Committee does so much in this regard.”

Since trade and investment between the United States and China have been indispensable elements of the bilateral relationship, the National Committee also used this occasion to honor American companies for their active involvement in Sino-American commercial relations. All four companies’ contributions were recognized during the evening’s program.

At a time when forging strong international ties is more important than ever, the National Committee is excited about launching a new program that will promote dialogue among young leaders in the United States and China. In 1984 the National Committee pioneered Track II bilateral discussions with its “Distinguished Citizens’ Dialogue.” We believe there is now a need for an additional forum, one that will provide the younger generations in the two countries the opportunity to meet on a regular basis to explore substantive issues and to develop enduring friendships.

The Committee is therefore initiating another “first.” The Young Leaders Forum (YLF) will bring together bright young people who have already achieved recognition in their chosen fields and have the potential to go on to even greater accomplishments.

The initial Forum will be held in April 2002, bringing together 12 Americans and 12 Chinese. In future years, the event will expand to include 20 to 30 people from each country. Participants must be under 40 years of age, and will be selected from the fields of business, government, education, media, civil society, military, professional services, and arts and entertainment. They must demonstrate a strong interest in civic and international affairs and should have excellent character and goodwill.

The annual Forum will consist of a 3-5 day program with both intellectual and social dimensions. The intellectual component will consist of speeches, panels, debates, plenary sessions and break-out groups, with several leading experts from a variety of backgrounds invited to address the participants. Social events will include recreation and entertainment activities that encourage interaction.

We hope to build a network of leaders who can use their better understanding to strengthen bilateral ties in good times and avoid conflicts in bad times. “Our goal is to create the enduring friendships that will facilitate better U.S.–China relations, and even, perhaps, avert a crisis,” said National Committee President, John Holden.

Meetings will alternate each year between U.S. and Chinese locations at conference centers where attractive settings and casual environments will help facilitate dialogue among participants. The 2002 program will be held in southern California and activities will be planned around the
Continued from page 1 Gala

China operations began early in the twentieth century and all were among the very first to return when the United States and the People’s Republic re-established commercial links in 1972. As corporate citizens in China, they have made substantial contributions to economic development, worker education and local philanthropies.

A highlight of the evening was hearing David Gergen trace the evolution of the National Committee’s work, from its original education outreach programs, through its earliest delegations of athletes and performing artists, to its substantive Track II political dialogues, to its focus on such contemporary issues as judicial reform and natural disaster response. Slides of participants in National Committee delegations, high-level dialogues, public programs and corporate briefings provided visual accompaniment to his remarks.

Mr. Gergen also described his own 1991 trip to China under National Committee auspices, saying “I came away from it all not only with some specific information that stood me in good stead, but more important, with a sense and a smell and a feel for the country and the people.”

Leaders on both sides of the Pacific recognized the National Committee’s contributions to improving understanding between Americans and Chinese. President George W. Bush sent a congratulatory letter to the Committee and Premier Zhu Rongji delivered his best wishes via a videotaped message.

The dinner also served as the National Committee’s major fundraising event. Financially, this was the most successful dinner ever: in the final tally, $1,092,000 was raised. The National Committee extends its gratitude to all those whose contributions helped make this such a tremendously successful and memorable event.

President’s Message

In the aftermath of the terror of September 11, Americans have tried to comprehend the depth and breadth of antipathy toward the United States in the world of Islam, its roots and implications, and what combination of hatred, ideology, culture and opportunity could result in further threats to our security. A decade after the end of the Cold War we are engaged in another global struggle, a second cold war according to the historian Walter A. McDougall: “Cold War II: so many people thought it would be waged against China. But cold wars are not declared against mere geopolitical rivals – hot wars, yes, but not cold ones. Cold wars are fought against nations or movements that pose a genuine alternative and thus a threat to ‘our way of life’ at home.”

What September 11 means for America’s relations with its neighbors in Asia is the subject of the insightful essay by new National Committee board member Ralph A. Cossa reprinted in these pages. What it means specifically for our relations with China was discussed in a phone conversation with Mr. Cossa, excerpts of which appear on the Committee’s website. This is also the subject of a superb essay by former National Committee president and current Board Member David M. Lampton that will appear in the next issue of The National Interest, and will be posted on our website.

September 11 will add new layers of meaning to the Shanghai Communiqué, signed February 27, 1972 will be the occasion to do so in two programs that will take place at the National Press Club. The first is a luncheon speech by Dr. Henry A. Kissinger; the second a panel discussion with members of the press corps who traveled to China with the President on that historic 1972 trip.

On the subject of upcoming programs, I would like to call your attention to four that are in various stages of development. The 11th U.S.-China Dialogue will take place in the spring, as will the first meeting of the Young Leaders Forum. We are developing a new program designed to engage Chinese students studying in the United States and another aimed at creating opportunities for younger American scholars to play more prominent roles in shaping the public debate about China policy.

Sino-American cooperation in the war against terrorism may constitute a new organizing principle to help prioritize the many items on the bilateral agenda. This does not necessarily mean that contentious issues such as human rights would be relegated to footnotes. In fact, dealing with them may be more productive if cooperation, rather than contention, defines the overall relationship. If China were more confident that the United States saw its own interests best served by a successfully modernizing China and that its strategies were not designed to weaken her, for example, it would be easier for the two countries to have a truly useful dialogue on human rights.

The United States does have a big stake in China’s success, and in finding ways to work with China to ensure that both countries can pursue their futures in peace and security. If one of the results of September 11 is a deepening of the understanding in both countries that their most vital interests can only be served by cooperation and compromise, then out of darkness will indeed have emerged light.

John L. Holden
December 2001
FOREIGN MINISTER TANG JIAXUAN ADDRESSES NATIONAL COMMITTEE GUESTS

China’s Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan addressed the current status of Sino-American relations in light of the tragedies of September 11 during a dinner in his honor, cosponsored by the National Committee and the U.S.-China Business Council in Washington D.C. on September 20.

Minister Tang expressed heartfelt concern and sympathy for the victims of the September attacks and their families and stressed China’s solidarity with the American people.

“I felt such pain in my heart when I saw the familiar World Trade towers collapse and claim so many lives, and great indignation at these terrorist crimes,” Tang said. “This incident has not only brought disasters to the American people, but also posed a challenge to people everywhere. The Chinese people stand by the American people and the entire international community in the fight against terrorism.”

Most of Minister Tang’s address, which he delivered in English, focused on improving relations between the United States and China.

“The development of China-U.S. relations over the years has shown that there are no insurmountable barriers between us,” he said. “Though we may differ on a given issue, our common interests far outweigh our differences. The key to a sound relationship is to deepen mutual understanding and build up mutual trust.”

He went on to discuss China’s current plans for economic and social reforms, including strategies to expand China’s use of new information technology, spur economic growth and continue to improve democracy and rule of law.

Minister Tang also discussed Taiwan, emphasizing that China is paying close attention to U.S. actions vis-à-vis Taiwan.

National Committee Chair Carla Hills introduced the Foreign Minister. Robert Kapp, president of the U.S.-China Business Council moderated the discussion following Minister Tang’s remarks.

About 200 members and friends of the National Committee and the U.S.-China Business Council attended the dinner.

U.S. ENVIRONMENTALISTS TEACH WORKSHOPS, MEET COUNTERPARTS IN CHINA

Building on the success of the 1998 study tour to the United States for mainland Chinese, Hong Kong, and Taiwan environmental NGO leaders, the National Committee sent a delegation of five American environmental education specialists to China for an 11-day program designed to foster a dialogue between teachers, administrators, NGO leaders, and students in the field of environmental education and awareness-raising.

The National Committee initiated this project in response to high demand from both American and Chinese environmentalists who have participated in past National Committee programs. From May 27 to June 6, 2001, the delegation members visited Beijing, Qingdao, Harbin, and the Zhalong Nature Reserve.

The Chinese Environmental Education and Communications Institute of the State Environmental Protection Association hosted the delegation and planned the study tour itinerary with the National Committee. The program involved meetings with educators, government officials, businesses, environmental organization representatives, students and media specialists. It also included site visits to schools, nature reserves, and museums.

A few highlights of the program included a meeting with officials at the Laoshan Mountain Nature Reserve, a day long tour and introduction to activities at the Zhalong Nature Reserve, a day of workshops at Harbin Institute of Technology, a visit to the Siberian Tiger Reserve and Breeding Center in Heilongjiang province, and participation in several activities in conjunction with World Environment Day, which took place during the trip.

Throughout the trip, the delegation members held workshops to introduce Chinese colleagues to American environmental awareness programs, addressing such issues as urban environmentalism, biodiversity, pollution, conservation, energy efficiency, and species preservation. Linkages were made between environmental leaders, information and resource materials were exchanged, and friendships were formed.
U.S. NEW MEDIA DELEGATION EXPLORES INTERNET USE IN CHINA

The National Committee and the Journalism and Media Studies Centre of The Hong Kong University cooperated on a project that enabled three American New Media experts to meet with Chinese counterparts during a study tour in early September. The program was partially funded through a grant from the Department of State’s Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs. The group visited online publications, media organizations and universities in Beijing, Shanghai, Xiamen, and Hong Kong and discussions were held with Chinese involved in the study, regulation, and consumption of the New Media.

The delegation included Scott Woelfel, founder and former president of CNN Interactive; Barbara Palser, former director of training at Internet Broadcasting System, who is now at the Poynter Institute in St. Petersburg, Fla.; and Andrew Lih, professor at Columbia University’s Graduate School of Journalism and principal investigator of the University’s Interactive Design Lab.

Two of the journalists describe their impressions of the program in the following short essays.

Barbara Palser:

Everything I saw in China was larger than I expected. The Great Wall. The Forbidden City. Tiananmen Square. The media landscape. Nothing could be absorbed in one view.

My assignment on this trip was to discuss online news policy and ethics. Although generalizations are dangerous, I did develop a few impressions:

First, many of the working journalists and students we met seemed more concerned about the business and technological angles of Internet news than the quality of journalism online. That makes sense, given China’s history of media control and its future as a new member of the World Trade Organization.

Most Chinese news organizations do have Web sites, but few are concerned about special policies for the Internet since most stories are simply online versions of print or broadcast work. (The best Web content is actually being packaged by private, non-news entities like Sina.com.) I expect that policy and ethics will become more pressing as online journalism develops as a distinct profession—especially if government controls ever loosen.

Second, the government monitors Internet news as carefully as any other medium. By extending print and broadcast controls to the Web, officials thwart the underground journalism efforts common in many nations where traditional media are controlled but the Internet is not.

The blockade is not absolute; a large number of Chinese journalists consume foreign news online, directly or through proxy servers. Many people told us that they trust government-approved news more than foreign sources, but they do read outside sites for international coverage. In my view, this exposure is advancing reporters’ awareness of other media systems, whether or not they believe what they see.

Third, students were far more eager than professionals to debate media policy. I was intrigued that they often challenged America’s free press system rather than praise it, and that they seemed generally supportive of government regulation. These exchanges helped me consider my own values from a different perspective; I hope the students can say the same. The fact that they were interested in discussing the differences is a positive sign.

Summarizing this vast experience is as difficult as summarizing China itself. Our group gained great context through which to observe and describe the changes that will surely accompany WTO membership. For the groups we visited, I hope we provided a view of online news business and policy in the United States, and some constructive advice for approaching our common challenges.

One of the goals for these programs is that they live on. Sorting through more than 100 business cards I collected in China and Hong Kong is like reliving the journey. If I can put some of these contacts to use in my own writing and share them with colleagues, I’ll consider that goal fulfilled.

Scott Woelfel:

Despite the differences in our political systems, journalists in China still have a major effect on the lives of the public and on decision-making in both the public and private sectors. Indeed, it manifests itself in different ways than in the West. Or at least I thought it did before this trip. It’s that supposed difference that I have reflected on in the aftermath of September 11.

In all of our meetings with journalism students, the role of the journalist was discussed. More than once the point was raised that the role of the journalist is to support the government and its policies. Needless to say, when this postulate was put forward those of us from the West were quick to rebut it and to point out that we saw the role of the press as government watchdog. We made our arguments and gave examples, but there never was a meeting of the minds on the point, nor did we expect there to be. Each side staked out its position and left it so. I didn’t think the issue would come to mind again once I returned home.

Continued on page 5
The growth of civil society and the progress of democratization in Taiwan have made it easier than ever for groups of citizens to make their voices heard in public discourse. The labor movement in Taiwan has been taking advantage of this changed climate. As new confederations and NGOs formed in recent years, old unions began shifting away from total government control, and legislators revised labor laws. The National Committee could not have chosen a more appropriate time to host six Taiwanese labor specialists for a study tour of the United States.

The delegation included a mix of labor union and NGO representatives, academics, and government officials. Offering exposure to a wide range of labor issues, their itinerary included stops in Boston, Washington D.C., Detroit, and Seattle from July 21 to August 3, 2001. The program was funded by a grant from the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs at the Department of State.

The delegation members had a particular interest in labor issues in high-tech industries, since many companies in that field are moving production (and thus jobs) to Mainland China and other parts of Asia. To help the delegation members understand how American labor organizations are dealing with similar problems, there were several opportunities to explore worker training programs, paying particular attention to how unions and other organizations have helped workers cope with economic changes that have required them to learn new skills.

Many of the delegation’s activities were designed to provide an overview of the U.S. labor movement and its historical context, including the current challenges, debates, and reform trends and efforts. The group examined the organization of labor unions, especially the relationships between labor unions and corporate management and federal and local governments.

Meetings with the AFL-CIO, the Brookings Institution, the Heritage Foundation, the United States Department of Labor and the National Labor Relations Board offered the Taiwanese experts a thorough look at current issues in the U.S. labor movement on a national scale, from both government and private sector perspectives.

They also met with faculty experts at six American colleges and universities. One highlight was a meeting at Northeastern University where the head of the Center for Urban and Regional Policy, Dr. Barry Bluestone was joined by his father, Irving Bluestone, former vice-president of the United Auto Workers (UAW). The two discussed the history and influence of that union in America. Father and son delighted the delegation by commenting on the joys and pains of co-authoring a book. A surprise visit by former Massachusetts governor Michael Dukakis, currently a professor at Northeastern, added to an already unforgettable afternoon.

But come to mind it did in the aftermath of September 11. I, like many journalists, have criticized the extensive use of the U.S. flag in the graphics of network television news. I think that it compromises the neutrality that a news organization must have if it is to be free to cover all sides in any conflict. Imagine a producer in the field who is trying to obtain an interview with a Taliban official while his network looks like it might have been programmed by the Pentagon.

Seeing this made me think of our conversations with the journalism students. While in China, we felt quite comfortable in our position of neutrality and our role as watchdogs. But if any of the students could see what I was seeing, what would they think? They would see exactly what they professed as a desirable quality in a Chinese journalist: support of the government and its policies.

The next journalist delegation to visit will undoubtedly find a more critical audience on the matters of press freedom than the one we left behind.
National Committee 35th Anniversary Offers Chance to Reflect Upon Our History... 

What We Wanted to Do
By Robert A. Scalapino
Robson Research Professor of Government Emeritus
University of California, Berkeley

In mid-1965, Cecil Thomas of the American Friends Service Committee, with whom I had worked on various programs, came to see me with his colleague, Bob Mang, to discuss the formation of an organization dedicated to discussing U.S.-China relations. Earlier, major conferences on this subject in which I had participated had been held in Berkeley and Washington.

My initial feeling was that the idea was good but premature given the volatile atmosphere that surrounded the China issue. However, I agreed to contact certain academic colleagues in the East. They indicated an interest, and consequently, we held a small meeting on December 9 in New York. A general agreement was reached to establish a permanent organization.

The National Committee was organized on June 9, 1966, with four basic principles selected to govern its policies: education, not advocacy; representation of diverse views, but avoidance of left and right extremists; members to represent all facets of American society; and an effort to reach the general public, opinion makers, and government officials.

These principles were enforced and expanded in the years that followed. A wide range of seminars, conferences and presentations was sponsored, both regional and national. Committee members were drawn from business, labor, religious figures, and academics. Interaction with government officials was frequent, and in February 1968, Committee representatives spent 45 minutes with President Johnson. The tasks of disseminating information, exploring alternative policies, and shifting the issue of U.S.-China relations from shrill polemics to in-depth, less emotional dialogue were largely fulfilled in these early years.

In 1972, the Committee hosted the U.S. visit of a Chinese ping-pong team and that same year, board members were invited to visit the PRC, fairly soon after the Nixon visit. During the four-week stay, it was possible to interact with various Chinese in the grim aftermath of the Cultural Revolution, establishing contacts that were to continue in many cases through the years.

It is no exaggeration to assert that the National Committee played a major role in enabling the issue of China to be viewed in its full complexity, with policies examined with respect to American interests as well as those of the global community. The events of the 1970s followed, and subsequently, a new era dawned, one replete with multiple challenges down to the present, but with dialogue uninhibited.

AIG’s Maurice R. Greenberg, dinner chairman and honoree, welcomes guests.

What We Have Done
By John L. Holden

Tonight we will tell you about – and show you – some of the highlights of the National Committee’s work during its first thirty-five years. This work has played an important role in the development of U.S.-China relations, which in turn has contributed to China’s remarkable achievements over the past twenty-odd years.

The story of China’s development out of poverty, isolation, and oppression toward prosperity, global responsibility, and democracy is still being written. So is the story of the relationship between China and America. Because the National Committee plays a role in these evolving stories, we must continually adjust our work to the changing needs of the plot.

As we have done in the past, the Committee’s task in the future will be to address the cutting-edge issues in the increasingly complex relationship between the United States and China – the issues that will have the greatest impact on whether we will build our future together through cooperation, or ruin it through conflict.

We will therefore, continue to sponsor dialogue on sensitive security issues in the bilateral relationship. In light of the recent abhorrent attacks on the United States and her people, we will work hard to promote dialogue and cooperation with China on the urgent task of defeating terrorism.

A new program is underway that will enable members of the next generation of American and Chinese leaders to develop the understanding and friendships that may someday help to solve problems and avert crises.

Another new program will create opportunities for promising younger Asia scholars to bring their expertise to bear on the public and specialist debates that determine policy in the United States and, less directly, in China.

Our exchange programs will continue to support China’s pressing reforms of its judiciary, financial system and other key institutions by bringing policy-makers and practitioners together to examine how America’s experience might be relevant to China.

We will look for new ways for our programs to plant the seeds of cooperation between American and Chinese governmental and non-governmental institutions; when they take root we will then move on to new fields.

The Committee will continue to abide by the principles laid out by our founders 35 years ago, as described by Professor Scalapino on the previous page. In our interactions with the people of China we will faithfully reflect the values and diversity of America so that China understands us better. So that Americans understand China better, we will explore China’s values, diversity, and the many dimensions of the historically unprecedented transformation that she is now undergoing.

We will rely upon and add to the deep reservoirs of goodwill that our work has generated over thirty-five years. As always, we will rely on the support of the many corporate and individual members, foundations, and government agencies, whose generosity and encouragement makes our work possible.
Ushering in the Post Post-Cold War Era

by Ralph Cossa

The quarter did not begin on September 11, but (at least from an American perspective) most events that came before that date appear to have paled in significance or, at a minimum, require reassessment in light of Washington’s new war on terrorism. The horrific attacks on the World Trade Center towers and the Pentagon may help usher in the “post post-Cold War era,” by creating an opportunity for a fundamentally changed relationship between Washington and both Moscow and Beijing. It may also provide Tokyo with the incentive (and excuse) to take a major step toward becoming a “normal” nation and more equal security partner. While Washington’s attention is focused largely on the Middle East/Southwest Asia, the implications of the September 11 attacks and subsequent war on terrorism will be felt throughout the Asia-Pacific region.

While the attacks may have helped (at least temporarily) to create a spirit of bipartisanship in the United States, they did little to ease the highly partisan domestic political bickering in two of the region’s young democracies. On the Korean Peninsula, the resumption of North-South high-level dialogue means that Kim Dae-jung’s ruling party now seemingly enjoys greater cooperation with the North than with its Southern counterparts, including (former) members of the ruling coalition. Meanwhile, opposition parties in Taiwan seem more willing to cooperate with the government in Beijing than with the one in Taipei.

Prior to September 11, United States policy toward East Asia seemed to be evolving smoothly, following Secretary of State Colin Powell’s July swing through Japan, Vietnam, South Korea, China, and Australia. Powell also attended the annual ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) ministerial meeting in Hanoi, where he signaled a U.S. commitment to support the Asian multilateral security dialogue process.

One major diplomatic casualty of the emerging war on terrorism was President Bush’s long-anticipated first visit to Tokyo and Seoul to underscore his alliance-based Asia strategy. While Bush still attended the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Leaders’ Meeting in Shanghai, his planned en route visit to Washington’s two Northeast Asia allies was canceled, as was a follow-up trip to Beijing for a summit meeting with Chinese President Jiang Zemin. This did not generate serious charges of “Japan passing,” given the understandable circumstances and Bush’s willingness to hold separate side meetings with Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi Junichiro and ROK President Kim Dae-jung (plus Jiang) in Shanghai. Nonetheless, it represents a missed opportunity for President Bush finally to lay out his vision for East Asia to a broader Japanese and Korean audience.

9-11 Implications Has the post-Cold War era come to an end? Probably not . . . at least not yet. But we have the opportunity to create a new global paradigm, built upon a common goal of ridding the world of international terrorism; a goal that most nations, regardless of political system or religious belief (including Islam), can equally embrace, even if a common definition of what constitutes “international terrorism” may prove elusive. Once before, in 1990/91, there was an opportunity to create “a new world order” as a diverse group of nations came together to repel the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. But, as the Iraqi occupation ended, so too ended this first attempt by Washington to develop a more broad-based global security framework.

The Russians, no longer enemies of the United States, were still not true friends. In fact, prior to September 11, growing differences between Moscow and Washington seemed to far exceed common interests or objectives. The differences, already festering during the Clinton administration, seem to have been exacerbated with the advent of the Bush administration, despite some apparent positive personal chemistry between Presidents Bush and Putin.

Meanwhile, the end of the Cold War deflated much of the strategic rationale behind Sino-U.S. cooperation, just as Tiananmen ended America’s growing fascination with all things Chinese. Subsequent attempts to “build toward a constructive strategic partnership” were more style than substance, as painfully revealed by the Chinese response to the accidental bombing of the PRC embassy in Belgrade by United States/NATO forces. (Of note, the number killed during that terrible accident is less than the number of PRC citizens, not to mention ethnic Chinese, killed deliberately as a result of the World Trade Center attack.) The April collision between an American EP-3 reconnaissance plane and a Chinese jet fighter and the decision by Washington to aggressively pursue missile defense (MD) were just two of many points of contention that further degraded Sino-United States relations.

In short, prospects for cooperation with Moscow and Beijing on strategic issues seemed increasingly slim. All this changed on September 11. The terrorist attacks created a new strategic rationale for cooperation, generating an opportunity for a fundamentally changed relationship between Washington and both Moscow and Beijing. They also provide Tokyo with the incentive (and excuse) to take a major step toward becoming a “normal” nation and more equal security partner. Such outcomes are by no means assured. They will require careful, skilled management and a genuine desire to transform international politics. But, the
opportunity and incentive are now there, not only vis-à-vis Washington’s relations with Russia, China, and Japan, but region-wide.

New U.S.-Russia Paradigm? The area where the greatest change is possible and may indeed already be occurring is in relations between Washington and Moscow. President Vladimir Putin was the first to call President Bush to express outrage over the attack and pledge his support. Russian actions went beyond mere atmospherics. Immediately after the attack, U.S. military forces worldwide were placed on high alert. During the Cold War, this would have automatically prompted Moscow to respond in kind. Even in the post-Cold War world, a decision by Russia to increase its own military alert status would not have been considered out of the ordinary. What was truly extraordinary was Putin’s order for Russian troops to stand down so as not to add to international tensions, a decision he personally relayed to Bush. As Bush later observed, “it was a moment where it clearly said to me that he understands the Cold War is over.”

Since then, Putin has agreed to share intelligence with Washington and to open Russian airspace to U.S. humanitarian and support flights; he has even raised the prospect of Russian search and rescue support for U.S. combat operations, while increasing Moscow’s support to anti-Taliban forces. Most significantly, after some initial hedging Putin gave the green light to the former Soviet Central Asian Republics to allow U.S. military forces to stage out of bases there. Much has been written about Chinese concerns about a possible U.S. military presence in Central Asia, but the region remains first and foremost in the Russian sphere of influence. Russian acceptance (much less active support) of a U.S. military presence in its “near abroad” would have been unthinkable on September 10.

It behooves Washington, however, to ensure Moscow (no less than Beijing) that it seeks no long-term military presence in this region. Access rights and staging bases in Central Asia may be critical to conducting sustained combat operations against terrorist camps (and the Taliban leadership) in Afghanistan. Establishing permanent U.S. military bases in the region makes little sense, however, and runs the risk of undermining the chances of genuine long-term cooperation between Washington and Moscow.

Missile Defense Compromise? Even with this newfound spirit of cooperation, contentious issues remain. While Washington may be more understanding and tolerant of Moscow’s efforts to quell its own terrorist threat (emanating from Chechnya), criticism over human rights and other perceived Russian infringements on civil liberties is sure to continue. And then there’s missile defense.

Predictably, opponents of missile defense were quick, in the wake of September 11, to point out that such defenses were useless against the more likely threats America faces today, such as attacks by terrorists that next time may even employ chemical or biological weapons of mass destruction (for which the U.S. seems ill-prepared). Equally predictably, proponents argued that terrorists willing to conduct such a heinous act (and the rogue nations who so blatantly support them) would certainly not hesitate to fire a missile at a United States city, were they to get their hands on one. Regardless of which argument one personally favors, in times of crisis Washington politicians and defense planners can be expected normally to err on the side of being more, not less, cautious. It appears inevitable, therefore, that some form of missile defense will remain a key component of Washington’s overall homeland defense plan.

However, the debate over what form of MD will be adopted and how comprehensive an umbrella will be built is likely to be affected. Both the shock to the economy caused by the terrorist assault and the massive costs involved in developing a comprehensive homeland defense system provide additional incentive for developing a (less costly) limited system, in order to free up money to address other more pressing concerns. The Congressional decision to reduce the 2002 $8 billion defense budget allocation for missile defense by $400 million in order to help fund other defensive measures reinforces this analysis. This, plus the need for greater cooperation from Moscow on international issues in general, helps set the stage for closer relations.

Even before September 11, it appeared that the seeds had been sown for some type of compromise between Washington and Moscow. After all, the size and sophistication of Moscow’s nuclear arsenal gives it a great deal of flexibility. Moscow can easily live with a limited MD system aimed only at deterring attack from rogue states or responding to accidental or unauthorized launches.

Both President Bush and President Putin seem serious about wanting to redefine U.S.-Russia relations in order to finally put Cold War habits and constraints behind them. The war on terrorism presents them with a golden opportunity to do just that . . . if the hawks in both camps can be held in check.

An Opportunity for Improved U.S.-PRC Relations. The war on terrorism likewise presents Washington and Beijing with a common objective upon which to build greater strategic cooperation (even if none dare call it a “strategic partnership”). While I remain less confident about the desire and ability of leaders in both countries (but especially China) to seize this opportunity, fighting international terrorism is one area where United States and Chinese strategic objectives clearly overlap, given China’s serious concerns about terrorism (in part supported by Osama bin Laden) in its western regions.

China joined the rest of the international community in condemning the September 11 attacks and also acknowledged the appropriateness of a military response, provided it was directed at those proved to be guilty, avoided civilian casualties (always a U.S. objective), and was preceded by “consultations” with the UN. While Washington was likely not thrilled to have President Jiang calling other UN Security Council members to reinforce these preconditions, they were not particularly onerous.

On the positive side, Beijing sent a team of counter-terrorism experts to Washington to explore ways the two

Continued on page 10
sides could cooperate, amid positive signs that China was willing to share “useful intelligence” with Washington. What was most troublesome about China’s response to 9-11 was its initial attempt to create linkages between Chinese support for the United States with American support for China’s own fight against “terrorism and separatism,” which seemed to imply a Taiwan quid-pro-quo. This line of thinking was not pursued during Chinese Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan’s visit to Washington, but has served (as was no doubt its purpose) to make Taiwanese nervous about possible under the table deals. Addressing these concerns, Secretary Powell has provided assurances that there has been “absolutely no discussion of a quid pro quo” - I personally find it unbelievable that any U.S. administration, much less this one, would contemplate such a deal.

The real moment of truth in possibly redefining Sino-U.S. relations should come when Presidents Bush and Jiang meet in Shanghai. On some issues, like the need to combat international terrorism, they will easily agree. On others, like Taiwan, they no doubt will continue to agree to disagree - Bush can be expected to underscore both Washington’s “one China” policy and the need for a peaceful solution. The key to determining if a new Sino-U.S. strategic relationship is possible will be found in the nature of Chinese caveats regarding the war on terrorism and on Chinese statements regarding missile defense. If Beijing is wise enough to seek and then accept assurances from Bush that Washington is committed to a limited MD system that will not put China’s nuclear deterrent at risk and then expresses willingness to enter into a dialogue that acknowledges there are legitimate security concerns on both sides, this could open the door for the “normal, constructive, and healthy” relations Beijing professes to seek with Washington.

A More Normal Japan? Immediately after the attack, Prime Minister Koizumi went on record stating that Japan would “spare no effort in providing assistance and cooperation” in support of America’s war on terrorism. He followed this up with even stronger commitments to provide intelligence and military logistical support during his late September visit to New York and Washington (along with much-needed aid to Pakistan and to the people of Afghanistan).

Backing up these assertions, Koizumi has introduced new legislation that will allow the Self Defense Forces (SDF) to provide logistic and other noncombatant support to U.S. forces conducting counter-terrorist military operations (including the provision of supplies, transportation, repairs and maintenance, medical services, communications, airport and seaport operations, and base operations). Koizumi also put forth measures to permit the SDF to provide enhanced protection for U.S. forces and facilities in Japan. Polls show the Japanese public is behind Mr. Koizumi’s efforts - the fact that over 100 Japanese citizens were among those killed in New York no doubt provides additional incentive to support the U.S. anti-terrorism effort.

Even before September 11, Koizumi had signaled his desire to move Japan beyond the limits imposed by the current interpretation of Japan’s Constitution regarding his nation’s support for the U.S.-Japan alliance and Tokyo’s involvement in other collective defense efforts. (For more, see the Pacific Forum’s Issues & Insights report on United States-Japan Strategic Dialogue: Beyond the Defense Guidelines, May 2001.) However, it appeared unlikely that he would expend the political capital required to effect the change, given the need for painful economic reforms. The war on terrorism has provided Koizumi with the incentive (and excuse) to take a major step toward becoming a “normal” nation, not just to avoid a repeat of the “Gulf War syndrome” (where Tokyo was criticized for just writing a check), but because he sincerely believes that the time has come for Japan to become a more equal partner to Washington and a more active participant in international security affairs.

Nonetheless, it appears doubtful that Japan will seek or agree to become involved in direct combat operations - this would take revision or at least a major reinterpretation of the constitution and also goes well beyond what Washington appears to be seeking from Tokyo in terms of support for the war on terrorism. But Prime Minister Koizumi seems intent on expanding the definition of what constitutes appropriate alliance support, along with the necessary legislative changes (short of a constitutional revision) to make it possible. In this regard, the terrorist attack will have profound implications for the nature of the U.S.-Japan alliance that are likely to last long beyond the immediate war on terrorism.

Interestingly, the response from Beijing and Seoul to Tokyo's expanded (albeit non-combat) military involvement in the war on terrorism has been refreshingly muted, despite their history of strong objection to any action that increases the prospect of Japanese military involvement in just about anything. More true to form, Pyongyang has issued a strong condemnation.

Korean Peninsula Implications. South Korea, as expected, strongly condemned the terrorist attacks. ROK President Kim Dae-jung immediately expressed his intention to “fully support” U.S. retaliatory actions and his nation’s willingness to participate in any “international coalition” against terrorism. President Kim also proposed that the two Korean states adopt a joint resolution opposing terrorism at their high-level North-South talks in mid-September, a suggestion that was ignored by North Korea (and criticized by ROK opposition politicians). Nonetheless, North Korea joined the South in condemning the terrorist action, even sending a letter of condolences to Washington.

Pyongyang had been offered a golden opportunity by the Clinton administration to get itself off the State Department’s list of state sponsors of terrorism but failed to seize this chance. As a result, DPRK critics have been quick to point to Pyongyang’s continued presence on this list as Washington plots its comprehensive campaign against international terrorists and the states that support them. While there are no indications that the Bush administration intends to further complicate an already incredibly difficult task by adding North Korea to its list of targets, one can only hope
that increased U.S. and broader world attention on states that sponsor terrorism will provide Pyongyang with the extra push needed to take the actions necessary to remove itself from this list, including the expulsion of Japanese Red Army terrorists who have enjoyed safe haven in the North for decades.

If Washington is not likely to focus its anti-terrorist efforts on Pyongyang, it is equally unlikely to expend much effort to further convince Pyongyang to resume its dialogue. Secretary Powell has already stated that the Bush administration is prepared to resume talks anytime, anywhere, with no preconditions. While it would welcome a resumption of dialogue, Washington is not likely to go beyond its current offer and seems comfortable about letting the ball lie on Pyongyang’s side of the net.

In response to North Korea’s continued recalcitrance, President Kim has inexplicably been calling repeatedly on the United States to “make its best effort to resume talks” with the North. I say “inexplicably” since it is Pyongyang and not Washington that is setting the preconditions. Imagine if President Bush started urging President Kim to try harder to engage the North - Kim would (rightfully) be insulted. It would make considerably more sense, especially in light of current realities, for President Kim to be praising America’s willingness to talk and instead admonishing the North to “make its best effort to resume talks.”

Some Additional Thoughts

Let me conclude with some final thoughts about the evolving war on terrorism and its implications for Asia.

1. This is a war on terrorism, not a war against Islam, but it could still turn out to be the latter, given the efforts of radical elements to lead things in this direction. Washington and the West in general have been very careful to stress that Islam is not the enemy. But, leaders and clerics from moderate Islamic states and movements have in many instances become their own worst enemies. While condemning the September 11 attacks, many have argued against retaliation and some have gone so far as to assert that an attack on Afghanistan is an attack against Islam. The reverse is actually the case. Osama bin Laden and the Taliban are not out to destroy the United States, they merely want America to stop protecting the moderate Arab regimes, which are the real targets of their hatred and ambitions. Any Islamic leader or group that fails to subscribe to their radical, extreme definition of Islam is their potential enemy. It seems incomprehensible that moderate Arab and Islamic leaders, including those in Indonesia and Malaysia, are not being more outspoken about eliminating bin Laden and the Taliban since, in reality, they are (or could easily in the future become) the real target. Burying their heads in the sand will not protect them in the long term.

2. While President Bush has stated that “you are either with us or with the terrorists,” many states will try to remain essentially neutral (at least publicly) and will likely be allowed to do so. But this position may come back to haunt them. For example, prior to September 11, the Bush administration attached a high priority to helping Indonesia recover from its political and economic crisis while still maintaining its territorial integrity. Getting Washington to pay attention to anything not terrorist-related will now become more difficult. Convincing Washington to attach high priority to helping nations that have provided lukewarm support or sent strongly mixed signals (as Indonesia continues to do) will likely be impossible.

3. The Taliban must go! This is not just because they are clearly willing co-conspirators through their harboring of Osama bin Laden and his terrorist training camps and network. They must be eliminated in order to send a strong signal to other regimes that appear willing to actively support (or at least turn a blind eye toward) international terrorists located within their borders - this is what the Chinese call “killing the chicken to scare the monkey.” This does not mean trying to conquer or occupy Afghanistan or even to help select or underwrite the Taliban’s successor. That remains the task for Afghans themselves must tackle (with Western moral, humanitarian, and financial support when appropriate).

4. A prolonged, sustained anti-terrorist campaign does not equate to a DESERT STORM-type operation with half a million soldiers swarming over Afghanistan. The instruments of war will be as much or more political and economic as they will be military, and ground forces will likely be used sparingly, with the emphasis on special operations rather than traditional military assaults. This will require expanded access to staging bases throughout the region but should not result in a substantial U.S. military presence on the ground in Pakistan or elsewhere in the Middle East or Southwest and Central Asia. As noted earlier, efforts should be made to assure Russian, Chinese, and regional leaders that no permanent bases are being sought, not only to sustain the coalition but because such bases would likely cause more problems than they would solve over the long run.

5. It was right to lift the sanctions imposed against India and Pakistan after their May, 1998 nuclear tests but it would be wrong to forget about the dangers posed by nuclear arsenals in both countries, but especially in Pakistan. Every effort must be made to safeguard these weapons, including convincing (or compelling) New Delhi and Islamabad not to operationally deploy these weapons. Operational deployment brings with it an increased likelihood not only of accidental or preemptive launch but also of theft or a deliberate turning over of such weapons to terrorists.

6. Under current circumstances, the likelihood that the United States would use even tactical nuclear weapons in its war against terrorism ranges from extremely remote to nonexistent. The Pentagon’s refusal to rule out anything constitutes a standard response to questions about military options or tactics, not a signal worthy of the hand wringing taking place in the anti-nuclear community. On the other hand, Washington should make it unambiguously clear, as it did during the Gulf War, that the use of weapons of mass destruction - chemical, biological, or nuclear - in any future attack on the United States or its friends and allies is likely to draw a response using “all available means at its disposal.” This constitutes simple and direct deterrence.

Continued on page 12
7. Finally, U.S. preoccupation with the war on terrorism does not mean a lessening of commitment to East Asia security. Speculation to the contrary has already begun. In its first issue after the events of September 11, the *Far Eastern Economic Review* speculated that the attacks could threaten Washington’s “willingness to undergird the region’s often shaky security,” that the security of shipping through the Malacca Strait had somehow been “thrown into question,” and that the Spratlys “suddenly seemed more vulnerable” as the U.S. Seventh Fleet “went into self-defense mode.” This is absolute nonsense. The sustained deployment of 500,000 U.S. military forces during DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM a decade ago did not result in any diminution of America’s security commitment toward Asia; neither should a decision to focus on countering terrorism emanating from the Middle East/Southwest Asia.

**Asia Policy Still Evolving** Finally, a few words on Bush’s still evolving Asia policy, the major aspects of which remain essentially unchanged from those described in last quarter’s report (see “Bush Asia Policy Slowly Takes Shape,” *Comparative Connections*, Vol. 3, No. 2). Washington’s focus on strengthening its regional alliances, its desire to engage rather than confront China, and its willingness to resume dialogue with North Korea were all reinforced during Secretary of State Colin Powell’s July visits to Japan, Vietnam, South Korea, China, and Australia. Powell also attended the annual ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) ministerial meeting in Hanoi, where he signaled a U.S. commitment to support the Asian multilateral security dialogue process. At the ARF meeting, some notable progress was made in examining its future role in the area of preventive diplomacy.

At the risk of sounding like a broken record, I feel compelled to note once again that what’s still missing is a more comprehensive Asia “Vision Statement” spelling out the Bush administration’s overall goals and policies toward East Asia. It was hoped that Bush would provide this during his planned visits to Japan and Korea prior to the October APEC Leaders’ Meeting in Shanghai, which was also to include a follow-on meeting with President Jiang in Beijing. While Bush went to Shanghai, his long-anticipated first visit with Washington’s two Northeast Asia allies became a casualty of the war on terrorism.

In sum, the September 11 terrorist attacks have served as a wake-up call for America and the civilized world writ large. As horrific as the four hijackings and subsequent crashes were, they have helped set the stage for the creation of a post-post-Cold War era of cooperation among like-minded nations. While success is by no means assured, the opportunity exists today to create a new global paradigm, built upon the common goal of ridding the world of international terrorism.

K to 12th Grade School Principals Delegation

The National Committee welcomed a delegation of ten Chinese education officials and grade school principals for a two-week study tour in Washington, D.C., New York City, Phoenix, and San Francisco from June 5 - 19, 2001. This exchange is part of the joint agreement between the U.S. Department of Education and China’s Ministry of Education. During their stay in Phoenix, the delegation members met with Dr. Mimi Norton (center) a fifth grade teacher and former participant in the Fulbright-Hays Summer Seminar in China. Dr. Norton hosted the group at her school and her home.

A. Doak Barnett Memorial Essay Contest

A. Doak Barnett was an internationally recognized scholar, devoted teacher and loyal friend of the National Committee, from its founding in 1966 to his death in 1999. The National Committee is therefore pleased to announce the second year of the A. Doak Barnett Memorial Essay Contest. This competition recognizes original thinking and thoughtful expression of ideas by students of Sino-American relations. This year’s topic is: Identify a source of strength in United States-China relations. In what ways could both sides build on this strength to further cooperation, reduce tensions, or avoid potential problems?

Awards of $1,000 each will be made to the top American and top Chinese essayists. The deadline is February 28. For further details, check the National Committee website (www.ncuscr.org) or contact Sara Bush at sbush@ncuscr.org.

To read the transcript of John Holden’s interview with Ralph Cossa, please go to the National Committee on U.S.-China Relations website at www.ncuscr.org.
For more than two decades, the National Committee has coordinated the Fulbright-Hays Summer Seminar to China for American educators, funded by the U.S. Department of Education. This year’s group of 16 American teachers and education specialists spent five weeks learning about China in Beijing, Xi’an, Kunming, Shanghai, and Hong Kong. Professor Stanley Rosen of the University of Southern California was the scholar escort. National Committee staff Kimberly Catucci and Shenyu Belsky worked with China’s Ministry of Education to organize the program.

Valerie Person, a 2001 participant and wrote the following essay about her impressions of her trip to China and what the experience has meant for her.

Don’t anticipate, just participate.” Fellow Fulbrighter Suzanne’s wise words served me well during my journey to China. Never having been to this colossal enigma of a country, I survived and thrived by releasing preconceived expectations, instead just going with the assurance of uncertainty; living, breathing, sleeping the Daoist concept of wu-wei or actionless activity. My dance with the dragon was at times as awkward as doing the polka with a whale, but it was an exciting dance nonetheless.

My official introduction began as soon as I walked out of the airport into the steam bath of the Beijing night air, my ears listening for the Chinese imperial music I had envisioned as a backdrop to my entrance. The music was not there. Although brimming with questions, I fought to stay awake, having gone without sleep for more than a day and feeling the effects of the soporific heat. Morning greeted me early in my hotel room with the true opium of China: hot tea, an addiction I delighted in during my stay in the Orient. The adventure was underway, my daily routines consisting of listening to erudite lecturers at Beijing Normal University, visiting intriguing historical sights, coping with the ubiquitous Asian-style bathroom facilities, and perfecting the art of eating with chopsticks. I grew more adept at ferreting out the subtle shades of meaning buried in conversations I had with my Chinese friends. I had heard the cliché that “China is complex,” but experiencing it firsthand convinced me of the profundity of it. Navigating the waters of Chinese ideas such as collectivism and “everything is public” challenged my western values of individualism and privacy. I see the benefits from living in a completely foreign culture with 15 other loving but sometimes-neurotic American Fulbrighters. Like any roller coaster, my ride through Beijing, Xi’an, Kunming, and Shanghai consisted of dips and rises. Arduously climbing to the top of the Great Wall of China with my buddies Gerri and Judy and planting my exhausted, Currituck, N.C. feet on this Chinese monument exhilarated me. I am convinced that all eyes will undoubtedly be on China this century, a country of great tradition and exciting transformation.

Proudly, I now wear the t-shirt that proclaims, “I climbed the Great Wall.”Ironically, physically conquering the Great Wall has triggered the removal of personal walls in my life; providing the catalyst for teaching my students the things I have learned in China that will tumble down walls that exist between China and the United States.

Sharing my dance with the dragon with students at Currituck County High School as well as with other educators is a privilege. I am an emissary on a mission: Help Americans unwrap the mystery of China to foster mutual understanding, genuine cooperation, and a commitment to humanity between these two great nations. The reminiscences of my China trip are indelibly printed in my mind. My dance with the dragon is one I will remember forever. Although I’m home, this is only an interlude. I have a feeling this dance is not over. China is a country on the move.
Chair Carla A. Hills captured the heartfelt sentiments of directors, members and staff when she thanked Barber B. Conable, Jr. for sharing his astute leadership, rich experience, and warm and witty nature during his ten years of service as National Committee chairman. Barber was honored by his fellow directors at a special dinner held after the Annual Members Meeting on December 6.

A photo album that highlighted some of his public duties as National Committee chairman from 1992 to 2001 was presented to Barber. But as evocative as some of the pictures were, they could not capture the countless occasions he welcomed guests to our programs, took the podium to introduce American policy leaders and visiting Chinese dignitaries, led National Committee delegations to China, chaired the U.S.-China Dialogue, and shared his insights as commentator or moderator on panels. Nor could they even attempt to show the less visible, though more important, wise counsel and contagious enthusiasm he so generously offered, which enriched National Committee programs and enlarged our circle of friends in both the United States and China.

Barber brought a distinguished resume and a wide legion of admirers to his role as National Committee chairman. He served two decades in the U.S. House of Representatives, where he played a pivotal role in major policy decisions as a member (and for six years as ranking minority member) of the House Ways and Means Committee. After retiring from Congress, he spent five years as president of the World Bank. Since leaving Washington, he has served on corporate and nonprofit boards, and devoted more time to his passionate interests in Native American artifacts and folklore, flora and fauna, and poetry of the world.

The National Committee is grateful to Barber (and to his wife, Charlotte, who introduced us to him and allowed us to take up so much of his time) for his decade as chairman and his ready agreement to continue serving the National Committee as a director.

The National Committee’s Board of Directors welcomed the following individuals as new directors, following approval at the 35th Annual Members’ Meeting on December 6, 2001.

Kenneth W. Cole is Vice President of General Motors Corporation and directs the company’s government relations activities from Washington, D.C.

Ralph A. Cossa is Executive Director of the Pacific Forum CSIS in Honolulu, a foreign policy research institute affiliated with the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C.

William M. Daley is President of SBC Communications Inc. As Secretary of Commerce in the Clinton administration, he played an important role in securing support for permanent normal trade relations for China and the bilateral agreement on China’s WTO accession.

Martin Feldstein is President and Chief Executive Officer, National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) and Professor of Economics at Harvard University.

Bates Gill is a Senior Fellow in the Foreign Policy Studies Program at the Brookings Institution and Director of its Center for Northeast Asian Policy Studies.

Thomas M. Gorrie is Corporate Vice President, Government Affairs & Policy for Johnson & Johnson. He joined Johnson & Johnson in 1968, and has held positions in research and development, marketing and sales, strategic planning, health policy, and other areas.

Jamie P. Horsley is an adjunct professor at Florida Gulf Coast University and a consultant to The Carter Center’s China Village Election Project.

Richard Matzke is Vice Chairman of the board of directors for ChevronTexaco Corp. and is responsible for directing the company’s worldwide exploration and production business.

Thomas R. Pickering is Senior Vice President for International Relations, Boeing Corporation in Washington D.C. He was formerly Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs and U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, the Russian Federation, India, El Salvador, Nigeria, and Jordan.

Joseph W. Prueher was the U.S. Ambassador to China from November 1999 to May 2001. Ambassador Prueher previously served as Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. Pacific Command, capping a 35-year career with the U.S. Navy.

William R. Rhodes is Vice Chairman of the board of directors of Citigroup Inc., where his portfolio includes client relationships in emerging markets worldwide, relationships with governments and other official institutions, and appointment of Citigroup’s senior country officers.

J. Stapleton Roy is the Managing Director of Kissinger Associates, Inc. His 40-year Foreign Service career included such distinguished posts as Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence and Research, Ambassador to China, Indonesia and Singapore.

Nicholas V. Scheele is Chief Operating Officer at Ford Motor Company and President of Ford Automotive Operations. Mr. Scheele began his career at Ford in 1966 and has worked in the company’s North American and European offices.

Returning to the board as part of the Class of 2004 are Mary Brown Bullock, Jerome A. Cohen, Edward T. Cloonan, Kenneth Lieberthal, Henry P. Sailer and James R. Schlesinger.
Corporate Briefing and Luncheon Address
Donald Tsang,
Chief Secretary for Administration
Hong Kong SAR
September 10, 2001

The National Committee hosted a breakfast meeting for its corporate members with and cosponsored a luncheon program with the Asia Society and the Hong Kong Economic & Trade Office for Hong Kong’s Chief Secretary Donald Tsang. In his remarks, he emphasized the viability of the “one country, two systems” model and predicted that several perceived economic challenges to Hong Kong could prove to be beneficial. He said that China’s WTO accession could serve as an economic stimulus to the region and could increase Hong Kong’s GDP by a half-percentage point.

Broadcast Articles:
APEC Summit Meetings
October 17 and 22, 2001

As a special service to members and friends, the National Committee broadcast a series of short, analytical articles on major events in U.S.-China relations via email and fax. In October, four articles examined the impacts of the APEC summit meetings in Shanghai and President Bush’s first visit to China.

Reflections on Chinese Intellectual Thinking
Discussion with Zi Zhongyun
October 27, 2001

The National Committee and the China Institute cosponsored this program with Professor Zi Zhongyun, former director and current senior fellow of the Institute of American Studies at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences in Beijing. Professor Zi discussed several of the most controversial intellectual debates in China today, including perceptions of Chinese history and development, and comparisons between Asia and the West.

Corporate Conference Call
Recent Legal Developments and Trends in China:
Meeting the Challenge of WTO Accession
November 8, 2001

Attorneys Jamie Horsley and Stanley Lubman briefed National Committee corporate members on steps China has already taken to meet WTO obligations and others that it is considering. Among the topics addressed were transparency, trading rights, administrative law developments and technical barriers to trade. The speakers also considered the impact of WTO accession on China’s legal institutions.

Broadcast Articles:
Taiwan Election Briefing
December 3, 2001

A series of brief articles offered National Committee members an initial analysis of the outcome of Taiwan’s December 1 Legislative Yuan elections, and provided an update of the status of the Taiwan’s economy and cross-Strait economic links.

Youthful Voices:
A Candid Discussion with Chinese University Students
December 4, 2001

Based on the success of a similar program last year, the National Committee and the China Institute cosponsored a panel discussion with three students participating in our AOL Time Warner internship program. Marcus Brauchli, national editor of the Wall Street Journal moderated discussion as the students, from Shanghai’s Fudan University, reflected on their impressions of the United States and the media since their arrival in early September.

Corruption in China:
Costs and Consequences
December 11, 2001

Economist Hu Angang shared some of the findings of his recent research on corruption in China with National Committee corporate members, including his estimates of economic losses due to corruption and his estimates for reform. Lu Xiaobo of Columbia University and Daniel Rosen of the Institute for International Economics served as discussants. They questioned whether the best means of limiting corruption is through more effective economic policies, more aggressive enforcement of current controls or creation of new institutions and considered whether China’s WTO obligations might be used as a roadmap for dealing with corruption.

Annual Members Address
December 6, 2001

Former U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Richard C. Holbrooke told National Committee members that he thought the events of September 11 would mark a significant turning point in U.S.-China relations. The shared objective of defeating terrorism would provide a new strategic framework for the relationship, in much the same way that the common cause of opposing the Soviet Union opened the door to Sino-American cooperation in the Nixon-Kissinger era nearly 30 years ago.

Do We Have Your Email Address?

In October and December, many National Committee members and friends received exclusive analytical articles about major events affecting U.S.-China relations, right in their email in-boxes.

If you would like to receive our email broadcasts in the future, please send your name and email address to info@ncuscr.org. The full text of the articles mentioned above can be found at www.ncuscr.org
During 2001 the National Committee lost several longtime friends and members who were key figures in the development of relations between the United States and China. In our Spring/Summer issue, we paid tribute to Arthur Hummel, Michel Oksenberg and Leonard Woodcock. Shortly after publication of that issue, another friend, Ambassador John H. Holdridge, passed away at the age of 76.

John became a National Committee member following his 1986 retirement from nearly 40 years in the Foreign Service. As the National Security Council’s senior staff member for East Asia and the Pacific, John accompanied Henry Kissinger to China in 1971 to lay the groundwork for President Nixon’s historic visit the next year. He traveled with President Nixon to the People’s Republic in 1972 and witnessed the signing of the Shanghai Communiqué. A year later, he became deputy chief of the U.S. Liaison Office in Beijing, precursor to the U.S. Embassy. John became Ambassador Holdridge in 1975, serving at the U.S. Embassy in Singapore. He was Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia and the Pacific in the Reagan Administration and returned to Asia as Ambassador to Indonesia from December 1983 until January 1986.

We fondly remember John not only for his dedicated government service, but also as a stalwart supporter of National Committee activities, especially the Scholar Orientation Program (SOP). Year after year, John and his wife of more than 50 years, Martha, opened their home to welcome SOP participants. These scholars were riveted by John’s stories about the early days of Sino-American relations. John always enlivened SOP host family dinners with his renditions of traditional Chinese tunes beautifully performed on his Chinese flute.

In keeping with his interests and generous nature, John’s family asked that memorial contributions be made to several of the organizations he supported, including the National Committee’s Scholar Orientation Program. We’re deeply touched that, through this memorial fund, John’s spirit will continue to be part of this annual program.